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Abstract 
With the recent proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) the tendency 
world-wide has been seemingly toward trade liberalization.  This thesis is primarily 
concerned with the impacts RTAs have had in the Western Hemisphere regarding 
agricultural trade flows.  Utilizing the framework of the Gravity Model, agricultural trade 
flows for 24 Western Hemisphere Nations were examined. In the course of the study it 
was expected that if RTAs were to have an effect it would be a positive Trade Creation 
Effect and a negative Trade Diversion Effect with positive effects for GDP of 
importer/exporter and population size of importer/exporter and a negative effect for that 
of distance.  Of the five agreements examined (NAFTA, AC, MERCO, LAIA, and 
CACM), NAFTA and LAIA were the only positive (but non-significant) as to Trade 
Creation effects while AC, MERCO, and CACM were all negative (but non-significant).  
It was also interesting to note that of the agreements, NAFTA, had both a positive and 
significant (p=0.023) diversionary effect with the remaining agreements all being 
negative (as expected) and significant regarding trade diversion.  It was also concluded 
that GDP (importer) and distance also had the expected signs (+,– respectively) with 
distance also being significant (p=0.0001).  It was concluded that RTAs had a more 
pronounced effect on inter-industry trade versus intra-industry trade and that with the 
passage of more time, further analysis may substantiate the claim of a positive RTA 
effect on agricultural bilateral trade flows.  3
Introduction 
 
The concept of regionalism is not a new one.  Regionalism is defined, in the 
context of this study as the preference of nations to trade with nations with which a 
common geographical region is shared.  One of the obvious reasons for regionalism is 
that it overcomes distance as a hindrance to trade.  In the literature, distance is commonly 
referred to as a ‘friction to trade’, subsequently, distance is viewed (from both intuitive 
and econometric viewpoints) as having a negative impact on trade flows, and as a result 
insinuating that from both expectation and economic theory a negative sign should be the 
expected sign for the distance coefficient in any econometric equation (Pöyhönen,1963, 
Linneman, 1966, Tinbergen, 1962).  Srivastava and Green assert that of all the 
determinants of trade intensity between nations, distance is the single most important 
determinant. (Srivastava and Green, 1986). 
There are also other underlying reasons for the rise of regionalism world-wide.  It 
has been proposed that regionalism has been embraced due to frustration with the delay 
in GATT negotiations and that the United States has shifted its tendencies from that of 
multilateralism to that of ardent regionalism. (Baldwin, 1997)  The GATT received notice 
of 124 regional trading agreements from 1948 to 1994, and after the WTO had been 
instituted in 1995, the GATT/WTO received notification of an additional 130 agreements 
covering both goods and services (WTO, 2006).  Some of these agreements are no longer 
in force having been amended by subsequent agreements, etc. but as of 2002 there were 
162 agreements in force with the number projected to rise to 300 by 2007 (WTO, 2006).  
Proponents of RTAs argue that RTAs allow countries to gradually work toward global 
free trade while providing a window of respite for domestic industries that need time to 
adjust to the specter of global competition.  Critics argue that the proliferation of RTAs   4
has spawned issues in trade that will in the end hinder multilateral trade negotiations (ex. 
complex trade preferences, fear of dumping accusations and the attendant retaliatory 
action, etc) (GTN, 2006).  The existence and creation of RTAs will be the subject of 
debate for some years to come. In this paper we examine to see the role, if any, RTAs 
play in trade creation and diversion in the Western Hemisphere. 
The Gravity Model 
 
Newton postulated the “Law of Universal Gravitation” in 1687 describing the 
attraction between two forces as the result of the product of the mass of the two bodies 
divided by the squared distance between the two bodies multiplied by a gravitational 
constant (read frictional force). (Head, 2003)  The Gravity Model has been used since the 
early 1960’s to describe bilateral trade flows between nations.  Pöyhönen (1963) and 
Tinbergen (1962) were among the first to utilize the Gravity Model in their respective 
studies regarding trade.  Linneman (1966) employed the Gravity Model in his exhaustive 
study on world trade flows.  In Linneman’s model, more variables that tended toward a 
more theoretical justification of the Gravity Model rather than the more intuitive 
arguments of Pöyhönen and Tinbergen were added (Deardorff, 1995).  Linneman’s 
version of the Gravity Model was said to be grounded in that of a Walrasian General 
Equilibrium System.  In 1974, Leamer employed both the Gravity Model and a 
Heckscher-Ohlin model in order to lend credence as to the motivation for the explanatory 
variables in his regression analysis of trade flows, Leamer however refrained from 
combining both the Gravity Model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model together theoretically 
(Leamer, 1974).  Attempts to justify the Gravity Model theoretically would be addressed 
by several parties.  In 1979, Anderson proffered his theoretical justification for the 
Gravity Model, where he proposed that by modeling preferences over traded goods only, 
by assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences (and in an appendix CES preferences) and by   5
making what is commonly known today as the Armington Association of the national 
differentiation to the origins of goods, the Gravity Model could be derived. Bergstrand 
would follow Anderson in 1985, where Bergstrand posited that, like Anderson, by 
assuming CES preferences and accepting the Armingston Assumption for traded goods, a 
reduced form equation for the estimation of the flow of goods between nations could be 
obtained.  The generalized Gravity Model equation is of the form: 
  lnXij= lnAj + lnYi + lnYj + lnNi + lnNj + lnDij + U 
where lnXij is the log dollar amount of the flow of goods from country i to country j, 
lnYi(j)  is the log of country i(j)’s income (normally GDP), ln Ni(j) is the population of 
country i(j), lnDij is the log of distance between i(j), and U is a randomly distributed log 
normal error term.  Also, there can be other explanatory variables in the Gravity Model 
that capture positive benefits from mutual RTA membership (Trade Creation), potential 
negative benefits from one party a member of a RTA and the other party not a member 
(Trade Diversion) and any colonial or linguistic ties any two countries might share in 
common. 
Employment of the Gravity Model as to RTA Analysis 
Not only has the gravity equation been used in examining bilateral trade between 
generalized groups of nations, it has also been utilized in examining the trade creation 
and trade diversion effects in particular regions and within particular trading blocs. 
Carrillo and Li utilized the Gravity Model in an attempt to determine what influence the 
Andean Community and MERCOSUR preferential trading agreements had had on 
trading patterns from 1980-1997, focusing primarily on intra-regional, intra-industrial 
trade.  Carrillo and Li found that the AC and MERCOSUR had had an effect on intra-
regional and intra-industrial trade but when compared with other crucial variables their 
impact was somewhat diminished.  The impacts of the regional trading agreements were   6
limited relatively to particular product classes rather than to all the products considered.  
Koo, Kennedy, and Skipnitchenko utilized the Gravity Model in analyzing the effects that 
Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs) have had on agricultural trade.  
The RTAs that were examined were: the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), 
Andean Community (CAN), the EU, and NAFTA.  Koo, Kennedy, and Skipnitchenko 
found that RTAs had, overall, a positive and significant influence on increasing trade 
volumes among member countries and that RTAs could have a positive trade diversion 
effect (in this case for NAFTA).  This positive effect being derived from the low 
substitutability between traded goods.  According to the authors, another reason for the 
positive trade creation effect could be that since there was a positive trade creation effect 
in the case of NAFTA, overall demand increased, offsetting any trade diversion effects.  
Koo, Kennedy, and Skipnitchenko concluded that RTAs increase welfare for RTA 
members and, to a lesser extent, non-RTA members as well. 
Data Employed 
 
  Standard Industrial Trade Classification Revision 3 agricultural commodity data 
for classes 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), and 4 (animal, vegetable 
oils, fats, and wax) was obtained from the United Nations’ COMTRADE database and 
was used in this analysis.  After examining the data available from the United Nations, it 
was determined that 2001 was the year that would have the requisite export information 
for all twenty-four countries included in this study.  Those twenty- four countries being: 
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, the United States, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Gross domestic product (2001) and population (2001) information were from 
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics Database and   7
Browser 2006, the physical distance between capital cities was calculated using 
Environmental Systems Research Institute’s geographic information systems software 
package, ArcView3.x.
1 The information on language commonality, etc. was obtained 
from the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook (2005). Statistics regarding 
concentration for farm equipment (tractors) to hectares of arable/permanent land were 
derived from FAOSTAT.   
The Variables 
 
  Total bilateral trade flow in agricultural commodities for country pairs, i and j, in 
log form is the dependent variable for this study.  Table 1 contains the variables that were 
considered in the gravity model.  The independent variables are income for i and j, 
population for i and j, distance between i and j and dummy variables for NAFTA, AC, 
MERCOSUR, LAIA, and CACM, and dummy variables for possible trade diversion for 
NAFTA, AC, MERCOSUR, LAIA, and CACM, also there is a variable, RATIO, that takes 
into account the ratio of tractors per hectare of arable/permanent land for exporting 
country i  to tractors per hectare of arable/permanent land for importing country j. Table 2 
shows the sources from whence the data was obtained. 
Results 
  In this paper it was our express purpose to develop a gravity model that would 
determine the bilateral trade flows of agricultural commodities in the Western 
Hemisphere and account for the trade creation and possible trade diversion effects of 
RTAs included in the model.  In this section, we will examine the results of the gravity 
model that were obtained and analyze the results to see if trade creation and trade 
diversion effects were captured in the parameters of our specific model.  In estimating the 
                                                 
1 Sincere thanks to Huizhen Niu for her calculation of i to j distances used in this study.   8
model, Ordinary Least Squares Regression was employed using SAS, version 9.0 for 
Windows (English).   
The reasons that nations trade have been attributed to their incomes and 
populations.  Nations normally trade less when the transaction costs outweigh the cost 
savings that would be incurred in engaging in trade.  We saw earlier the impact that 
increased distance had on transaction costs.  The further the distance, the higher the 
transaction costs to engage in trade, thus lessening trade activity between a particular pair 
of nations.  With the advent of RTAs, the issue of transactions costs was met head on, 
that nations, with a reduction in certain ‘frictions to trade’ (e.g., lowering of tariff barriers 
between i and j) would trade more with each other (i.e. trade creation) than where 
‘frictions to trade’ were more prevalent (the presence of tariff barriers etc.) i.e. trade 
diversion.   
The estimated OLS gravity model equation that was obtained is of the form: 
   logXij (bilateral trade flow) = –25.16 –0 .24* log(Yi) +0 .19* log(Yj) 
 – 2.47*log(dij) + 2.67*log(Popi) + .94*log(Popj) +0 .72*lang  
+ 0 .44*NAFTA – 2.57*AC – 1.16*MERCO + 1.42*LAIA  
 – 0 .30*CACM + 2.09*NAFTAD – 2.00*ACD  
– 1.86*MERCOD – 2.10*LAIAD  
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LogXij  Log of bilateral trade flow from i to j   
a1  Intercept term  (+/–) 
LogYi  Log of GDP for i   (+) 
LogYj  Log of GDP for j  (+) 
LogNi  Log of population for i  (+) 
LogNj  Log of population for j  (+) 
Logdij  Log of distance from i to j  (–) 
Lang  Dummy variable for language commonality  (+) 
NAFTA  Dummy variable for mutual NAFTA membership 
between i and j, employed for trade creation 
(+) 
AC  Dummy variable for mutual AC membership 
between i and j, employed for trade creation 
(+) 
MERCO  Dummy variable for mutual MERCOSUR 
membership between i and j, employed for trade 
creation 
(+) 
LAIA  Dummy variable for mutual LAIA membership 
between i and j, employed for trade creation 
(+) 
CACM  Dummy variable for mutual CACM membership 
between i and j, employed for trade creation 
(+) 
NAFTAD  Dummy variable where either i or j is a member of 
NAFTA but not both, employed for trade diversion 
(+/–) 
ACD  Dummy variable where either i or j is a member of 
ACD but not both, employed for trade diversion 
(+/–) 
MERCOD  Dummy variable where either i or j is a member of 
MERCOSUR but not both, employed for trade 
diversion 
(+/–) 
LAIAD  Dummy variable where either i or j is a member of 
LAIA but not both, employed for trade diversion 
(+/–) 
CACMD  Dummy variable where either i or j is a member of 
CACM but not both, employed for trade diversion 
(+/–) 
LogRATIO  Log of quotient resulting from the ratio of tractors 
to hectares of arable/permanent land for exporter i 
being divided by ratio of tractors to hectares of 
arable/permanent land for importer, j 
(+) 
   10




United Nations’ COMTRADE Database (2005) 
GDP (2001)  International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics Database and Browser (2006) 
Population (2001)  International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics Database and Browser (2006) 
Language 
Information 
Central Intelligence Agency’s World FactBook (2005) 
RTA Membership  World Trade Organization Web Site  
Tractor/Land Ratio  FAOSTAT 
 
  Table 3 gives a summary of statistical information for the parameters included in 
the model, discussion of the parameter values will then follow.  Specificity tests showed 
the model to be correctly specified and the residuals of the model were largely normal.  
Tests for heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan and White’s LM tests both highly 
significant) were positive, indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity, so remedial 
measures were taken to obtain robust results for our model.  This was accomplished in 
SAS utilizing the ‘PROC MODEL’ command, and within ‘PROC MODEL’ the equation 
was fitted to the dependent variable (the log of bilateral trade flows) utilizing the 
‘HCCME’ procedure(where HCCME=1).  The results that were obtained from this 
procedure are the results that are reported within the confines of this paper. 
The model coefficients had the expected signs for the most part with the exceptions of 
LGDPi, the trade creating dummy variables AC, MERCO, CACM and the trade diverting 
dummy, NAFTAD.  The log of country i’s GDP was negative and non-significant 
(p=0.24717).  This is not as unusual as might be expected.  In the Gravity Model, when 
total trade flows are examined, it is normally accepted that the standard sign for country 
i’s GDP is to be positive.  In this case the sign is negative.  This apparent contradiction is 
just that, apparent.  In agricultural trade, when an exporter’s income rises at home, that  
   11
Table 3. Empirical Results for the Gravity Model Equation 
Variable Estimate  S.E.  t-value  p-value 
Intercept  –25.16 5.45  -4.61  <0.0001 
lgdpi  –0.25 0.19 –1.32 0.1878 
lgdpj  0.20 0.17 1.15  0.2527 
lpopi  2.67 0.28 9.53  <0.0001 
lpopj  .94 0.26  3.66  0.0003 
ldistance  –2.47 0.48 –5.13 <0.0001 
NAFTA  0.44 2.69 0.16  0.8707 
AC  –2.57 1.87 –1.37 0.1704 
MERCO  –1.16 2.08 –0.56 0.5778 
LAIA  1.43 1.36 1.05  0.2946 
CACM  –0.30 1.83 –0.16 0.8704 
LANG  0.72 0.58 1.24  0.2161 
NAFTAD  2.09 0.90 2.32  0.0207 
ACD  –2.00 0.76 –2.64 0.0086 
MERCOD  –1.86 0.84 –2.22 0.0268 
LAIAD  –2.10 0.81 –2.58 0.0100 
CACMD  –2.14 0.74 –2.88 0.0042 
lratio .60  .19  3.19  .0015 
R
2  0.5366 
Adj. R




usually drives up domestic demand for agricultural products in the domestic market, with 
increased income/demand, come lessened exports of that particular commodity from 
country i to j, hence our negative sign on LGDPi.  The log of country j’s GDP had the 
expected sign (+) but was not significant (p-value 0.1990), the logs for both country i and 
j’s populations had the expected sign (+) and were both highly significant (p-value 
0.0001 and 0.0003 respectively).  The variable, lratio, indicating the relationship between   12
the quotient of tractor/arable land ratios between i and j was also significant (p-value 
0.0015) and had the expected sign (+).   
Because of the significance of the parameter coefficients for the populations of 
both country i and j, it can be projected that with a 1% increase in country i’s population, 
there would be a 2.67% increase in agricultural bilateral trade flows between i and j 
(because of the log-log nature of the model, the parameter coefficient value is the 
elasticity-for the continuous variables of gdp and population), with a 1% increase in 
country j’s population, there would be a .94% increase in agricultural bilateral trade 
flows between i and j. 
The log of distance had the expected sign (–) and was highly significant (p-value 
<0.0001) and with a 1% increase in distance between i and j there would be a 
corresponding 2.47% decrease in agricultural bilateral trade flows between i and j.  The 
trade creating dummies, NAFTA and LAIA were not significant but both had the expected 
sign (+) while the trade creating dummy variables AC, MERCO, and CACM had negative 
signs (–) and were all insignificant, the language commonality dummy variable, lang, had 
the expected sign (+) but was insignificant (p-value 0.2161), and the trade diverting 
dummies, ACD, MERCOD, LAIAD, and CACMD, all had the expected sign (–) and were 
all highly significant (p-value <0.01 for all). The trade diversion effects from ACD, 
MERCOD, LAIAD, and CACMD are quite marked, resulting in trade diversion effects of 
0.86%, 0.84%, 0.88% and 0.88% (respectively) decrease in bilateral trade between 
members/nonmembers of these particular RTAs. The elasticity for dummy variables is 
obtained from the expression e
b-1, where e is the exponential function raised to the 
coefficient parameter value, b, in our case b= –2 (for ACD), subtracted from 1.  For trade 
diversion effects the trade diverting dummy, NAFTAD, did not have the expected sign (–) 
rather it was positive (+) and was significant at the 5% level (p-value 0.0207). Using our   13
relation from above, e
b-1, we can say that NAFTA has contributed a 7.10% increase in 
bilateral trade flow between NAFTA member/nonmember trading pairs. Also, the log of 
the quotient of tractor/land ratios between i and j was significant (p=0.0015) and had the 
expected sign (+).  We conclude that for every 1% increase in country i’s tractor/arable 
land ratio over country j’s tractor/arable land ratio, one could expect a .61% increase in 
the flow of agricultural products from i to j.   
  It is interesting to note that of the trade creating dummies, AC, MERCO, and 
CACM are negative in sign and not significant to the model.  In this model the 
examination was of agricultural commodity trade between countries.  As the nations of 
the Andean Community, MERCOSUR and CACM are fairly self-reliant in agricultural 
production, it is not surprising to see the negative, non-significance of these results. In a 
model where both agricultural and non-agricultural production information were 
included, a negative, non significant result would have been viewed with some concern.   
Many RTAs are formed to help in the area of intra-industry trade.  In this study, we are 
examining primarily inter-industry trade in agricultural commodities.  
With NAFTA and LAIA we are encouraged to see the expected sign (+) but we 
notice that they are not significant in their explicative capability as to the variability in 
the log of bilateral trade flows from country i to j.  This could be that when RTAs are 
formed, there are usually time constraints to when/how barriers are reduced in certain 
areas.  It has been noted that agriculture remains an area that is very sensitive to quick 
changes (as to government interaction between the producers, reductions in domestic 
levels of production etc.).  Many agreements, among them NAFTA and LAIA, have 
specific time tables for the elimination of certain restrictions to trade.  NAFTA had a 10-
15 year goal of reducing/eliminating all external tariff barriers between trading members.  
As this research was conducted in 2006, and with NAFTA having been formed in 1994,   14
the time limit has not yet been reached for total tariff elimination.  In the case of NAFTA, 
the United States was already the largest foreign trading partner for both Canada and 
Mexico, so NAFTA’s effect was really in the easing of commodity movements with 
additional benefits to be observed (in the future) with the sun-setting of existing tariff 
protection schemes. With the trade diverting dummies, most had the expected signs and 
were significant with the exception of the trade diverting dummy, NAFTAD.  NAFTAD 
was positive and significant at the 5% level.  Normally with trade diverting dummies we 
would expect a negative effect and with NAFTA we do not obtain that result.  It could be 
explained that, with NAFTA, the ease of shipment of agricultural commodities had 
induced some benefits, not markedly observed in this model, that have had a positive 
effect on NAFTA members’ trade with non-NAFTA members.  It is possible that in some 
instances, when an agreement has boosted incomes in member countries, the positive 
income effect trickles over to non-member trade.  This is where a member nation that, 
because of increases in income, increases trade with non-member nations for the 
purchasing of commodities that are not obtained from within the framework of their 
RTA.  This trickle down effect could then lead to positive trade diversion effects and is 
offered here as an explanation as to the positive sign of the trade diversion dummy 
coefficient for NAFTA.  It is also interesting to note that the relation that our 
tractor/arable land relation had in describing the variance of the log of agricultural trade 
flows.  With the log of the quotient of tractor/land ratios between i and j being both 
positive and significant, it is surmised that the greater concentration of farm machinery to 
hectare of land in the exporting country i versus the importing country j, exports of 
agricultural products would be expected to increase as well.  Farm machinery tends to 
enhance efficiencies of production, with this additional efficiency comes inherent price 
advantages for the exporter relative to that of the importer.  If a foreign producer   15
produces an agricultural crop cheaper than their domestic counterpart, it is only natural 
for the foreign producer to fill the gap of production (that was handled formerly 
domestically) as domestic producers seek to enhance their own relative advantages in 
analyzing potentially more profitable markets in which domestic comparative advantages 
would better be employed.  Hence, advantage mechanization. 
Summary 
  In this study, it was initially proposed that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
would have a positive effect on bilateral trade flows.  That is, if two nations were 
members of the same RTA, a noticeable increase of trade should be observed between 
the trading pair.  In this regard we see that of the five RTAs analyzed (NAFTA, AC, 
MERCOSUR, LAIA, and CACM), none of them were significant in their explanatory 
capacity as to significant increases in agricultural bilateral trade flows.  This fact is not as 
disturbing as one would initially suspect, keeping in mind that agriculture is a highly 
protected commodity class and that the lifting of economic barriers to allow the free flow 
of goods in the field of agricultural commodities has not yet been fully realized.  It is also 
important to note that of the RTAs included that were not significant, NAFTA and LAIA 
had the expected sign (+).  With the advent of lowered tariff restrictions, trade flows will 
be less inhibited through reductions in tariff levels.  Once this occurs, a more significant 
explanatory contribution (from these RTA dummy variables) as to the flow of 
agricultural bilateral trade between those member states may be observed. Not only have 
the trade creating effects of RTAs been examined, it was also the purpose of this study to 
examine the possible negative effects RTA membership could have in diverting trade 
from traditional nation trading pairs.  The traditional pair of trading nations would then 
be replaced by non-trading pairs of trading nations who were mutual members of the 
same RTA.  Of the five agreements (NAFTA, AC, MERCOSUR, LAIA, and CACM), all,   16
with the exception of NAFTA, had the expected negative sign and all, except NAFTA, 
were highly significant, with p <0.0001.  NAFTAD was significant at the 5% level, 
although positive (+) in sign.  These results tend to indicate that. when nations do join a 
RTA, trade is diverted from traditional trading pairs to pairs of countries enjoying mutual 
membership in the same RTA.  This reallocation of resources from traditional trading 
sources to new nations was defined earlier as trade diversion. With the trade diverting 
dummy for NAFTA (NAFTAD) it is interesting to note the positive nature of the trade 
diversion dummy.  Stemming from this positive sign on NAFTAD, it can be deduced that 
membership in a RTA is not automatically negative when it comes to possible trade 
diversion effects.  Some nations, while enjoying the mutual membership effects in a 
RTA, could experience enhanced income effects from increased mutual RTA trade which 
would in turn lead to an increase in trade with non-RTA members in a nation’s bid to 
obtain items that are demanded by its population but not readily available from within the 
framework of RTA member states.  We conclude then that not all diversion effects are 
negative in nature.   
  As to the variables that were considered key to the foundation of the Gravity 
Model, (GDP, population, and distance), it is interesting to note that in the case of GDP, 
the log of GDP for the exporting country, i, was negative but insignificant while the log 
of GDP for the importing country, j, was positive but also insignificant.  As has been 
offered earlier, in the generalized Gravity Model, where all trade flows are observed 
(inter- and intra-industry trade) the generally expected result would be a positive relation 
between the logs of both country i and j’s GDP to bilateral trade flows.  In this particular 
case, we are examining the result of the logs of country i and j’s GDP to agricultural 
bilateral trade flows. Given how the market reacts in the exporter’s market with a rise in   17
income (the demand for agricultural commodities goes up, exports go down) it is not 
surprising to see an inverse relationship with respect to income.   
Another determinant of agricultural bilateral trade flows is the population of the 
respective trading pair.  In our model we saw both significance in the population for the 
exporting country (i) and the importing country (j).  Populations are determinants of 
demand.  The greater the population, according to economic theory, the greater will the 
demand be for goods and services.  Since the focus of this paper was on the flow of 
agricultural commodities across trading partners, population’s level of explanatory 
significance in the model is not surprising.  
With distance we noticed the significant (p<0.0001) relationship between the 
variation in the log of distance with the log of bilateral trade flows.  This is in agreement 
with the tenants of the Gravity Model and is also in agreement with economic theory.  
The farther country i and country j are from each other, the higher the transaction costs.  
In turn, the higher the transaction costs, the greater friction to trade will be between i and 
j, and thus, more economical alternatives to trade would be investigated by i and/or j.  
This investigation of more efficient, less costly trading structures would then lead to a 
lessened bilateral trade flow between the original trading nation pair, i and j.   
Finally, it was noticed that language did play a role in the flow of bilateral trade.  
The language commonality variable, lang, was positive (+) but insignificant, indicating 
that language commonality between a trading pair in the Western Hemisphere does not 
play as important a role in trade between countries as it would with more diverse trading 
pairs/blocs.  This result should not diminish the fact that sharing a common language 
allows countries to better understand their target market through having common cultural 
norms and not having to bridge a ‘psychic gap’ of any great magnitude. Learning a 
different language to conduct bilateral trade would present to a potential barrier to trade.   18
Conclusions 
 
  We have seen that RTAs could have a positive effect (yet insignificant) on 
bilateral trade flows, and that with some of the other RTAs (e.g. NAFTA, etc.) sufficient 
time will have to be allowed to pass before noticeable results could be obtained.  We 
have also seen that not all trade diversion effects are negative in nature, (e.g. NAFTA) but 
can, with increased income, have a positive effect on a RTA member’s trade with non-
RTA members. We saw the importance of population and, to a lesser degree, income as 
to explaining the variability in agricultural bilateral trade flows and these observations 
are in agreement with the literature.  Language was also observed as occupying an 
important place (yet insignificant) in its’ descriptive capability as to the variability in 
agricultural bilateral trade flows and this too, is in agreement with the attendant literature 
(as regards the sign of the parameter coefficient). Mechanization also is not to be 
underestimated in its ability to explain why some countries tend to export products to 
other similarly resource-endowed countries.  With all of the above in mind, it is held that 
this paper has accomplished what was stipulated from the beginning: to develop a gravity 
model framework that would describe the relationship between the flows of agricultural 
commodity trade in the Western Hemisphere and population, income, distance, language 
commonality, degree of mechanization, and RTA membership. 
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